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I. ABSTRACT
Characterising the person behind a cyber attack can be
highly useful. At a practical security and forensic level, it
can help profile adversaries during and after an attack, and
at a theoretical level it can allow us to build improved threat
models. This is, however, a challenging problem, as relevant
data cannot easily be found. They are not often released
publicly and may be the result of criminal investigation.
Moreover, the identity of an attacker is rarely revealed in
an attack. Here, we attempt a rather unusual approach. We
attempt to classify the adversary as a type of human user,
arguing that if it does not fit in any realistic profile of a
human user, then it is probably a bot. Hence, we are working
towards a system that is both a human attacker profiler and
an anomaly-based bot detector. For this, we first need to
build a technical system that collects relevant data in real-
time. As no such information exists, we experimented with
several different measurable input data and human profile
characteristics, evaluating the usefulness of the former in
determining the latter. We then present a case-based reason-
ing approach that classifies an attacker based on the values
of these metrics. For this, we use experimental data that
we have previously collected and are the result of a set of
cyber-attack scenarios carried out by 87 users. As a practical
application, we have developed an automated profiling tool
demonstrating the potential real-time use of the proposed
system in a quasi-realistic setting. We discuss this approach’s
ability for an adversary that has already gained access to
a target system. The profile identified should tell us the
characteristics of the adversary if it is human. If no profile
can be identified, we argue that this is a good indication it
is a bot.
II. INTRODUCTION
The behaviour of different cyber attackers may differ
depending on their skills, knowledge, experience, mode of
operation, tactics, education, target and many other param-
eters. As a result, researchers have always looked at the
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different profiles of cyber attackers from a social sciences
perspective. Computer scientists instead have focused on
developing security tools that help detect attack profiles
while they are in progress, and forensic tools that help
analyse attacks after they have occurred. There is also a
class of real-time forensic tools that help a human user
analyse attacks while they are in progress, for example by
presenting real-time network information in a user-friendly
manner [1]. Here, we set a different challenge. We try to
determine the approximate human profile of an attacker,
as defined by a set of characteristics, based on real-time
measurements and without the involvement of a human
operator. In addition, we argue that if a new attacker detected
in a victim machine does not fit any realistic human profile,
then this attacker is probably a bot. For this first attempt
to provide a corresponding detection tool that is usable
in real-time, we use the results of 87 experiments with
human attackers and use machine learning to develop a
set of rules that are incorporated in this tool. Machine
learning has been used extensively in finance, business and
health for its ability to provide answers based on association
modelling, prediction and forecasting [19] and has recently
been employed for scenario-based cyber incident notification
[22] and to model human behaviour to anticipate insider
cyber attacks based on personnel records and logs [20]. Here,
we use machine learning to profile the cyber attacker based
solely on events monitored automatically during an actual
attack and without any prior information.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section
III we give an overview of the literature related to our
problem domain. The methodology we followed to conduct
our analysis is presented in Section IV while the description
of the algorithms used for profiling is given in Section V.
Finally, Section VI presents how we used our approach
to detect a bot attack. We conclude our investigation with
Section VII which suggests directions for future work.
III. RELATED WORK
Bot detection is usually carried out at the level of a whole
botnet. The defender needs to have access to multiple nodes
across a network, so as to statistically analyse significant
amounts of incoming traffic and determine commonalities.
In this sense, botnet detection shares a lot of characteristics
with distributed denial of service detection [2], [3], [4],
where rates and similarities in large numbers of inbound
data packets reveal information about the attacker. That is
because the usual botnet life-cycle includes multiple phases,
such as communication over a command and control chan-
nel, that involve the generation of non-negligible network
traffic. For example, botsniffer uses correlation analysis al-
gorithms to exploit the inherent synchronisation of multiple
bots that belong to the same botnet [5]. BotMiner extends
this with advanced data mining techniques [6]. Of course,
the level of analysis that is required can only be performed
offline, after collecting all data from the various distributed
sources. A notable exception is the work of Ramachandran et
al., whose heuristics identify botnets by passively analysing
DNS-based Black-hole List lookup traffic [7]. As, in this
paper, we aim to detect bot behaviour through access to
a single machine, without network or other distributed
information that can be statistically analysed, our approach
is to try to first define what a human behaviour is, or in
other words what the typical profile a human hacker is.
As early as in 1985, Landreth, an accomplished hacker
himself [10], categorised hackers into novices, students,
tourists, crashers and thieves. Since then, there have been
several efforts to profile hackers in terms of their motivation
and personal characteristics, almost exclusively in social
sciences. A 2003 study of 457 self-identified hackers within
the Russian-speaking community was the basis for a flow-
based model of hacker motivation in relation to challenges
and skills [14]. More recently, the Hacker Profiling Project
provided the first steps towards applying the science of
criminal profiling to hacking [16]. Its researchers studied
the background and behaviour of 570 hackers through ques-
tionnaires and identified several useful patterns with regards
to demographics, age, attitudes and personal traits.
Kjaerland [12] used a 2000-2002 sample of reported
incidents to CERT/CC to classify incidents based among
others on the method of operation of the attacker. Using
smallest space analysis, the author determined the factors
that were most likely to happen together. The conclusions
that were reached at the time may not be applicable today,
but the approach probably is. Shaw et al. [11] have tackled
the profiling specifically of malicious cyber insiders from a
psychological point of view, focusing on history of negative
social and personal experiences, lack of social skills, sense
of entitlement and ethical flexibility. Watters et al. have
provided an ethnographic study of cyber attacks with the
aim to identify attacker profiles qualitatively [17]. Based
on benchmark indicators of cyber crime within the Aus-
tralian financial services system, their initial model relates
frequency, distribution and impact of attacks with national
indices, such as GDP, level of education, Internet penetration
and perceived corruption. Such models can be used in
the long-term to predict broader cyber attack trends, but
cannot be used in real-time or to profile specific attackers.
Kilger et al. [15] have provided an analysis of the social
structure of the hacker community through content analysis
of the words and phrases used. They provided a classifi-
cation of motivations, including money, entertainment, ego,
cause/ideology, entrance to a social group, and status. They
also demonstrated a case study of how monitoring of IRC
channels can help profile and often identify specific hackers,
but did not provide any systematic framework for this.
Although very interesting, most of these personal charac-
teristics of hackers cannot be measured in real-time and as
such cannot be of use during an actual cyber attack. Their
practical purpose has been to raise awareness and inform
training, policy and business processes [21]. Our purpose
instead is to develop a technical system that provides an
approximate profile of an attack’s perpetrator during the
attack, using data that can be captured in real-time on the
target computer. Thus, we have focused on characteristics
that, we argue, can be observed in real-time and in an
automated fashion (see Section IV-A).
IV. METHODOLOGY
In this section we give a description of the methodology
we adopted in order to carry out our analysis. We describe
the list of attacker features we identified, their classification
based on their observability and give the details of the
experimental data collection.
A. Identifying Cyber-attacker features
We have identified a range of features related to the
properties of a potential cyber-attacker. These are related
to cultural, professional and demographical characteristics
of the person behind the attack. The following list gives an
overview of the features in question.
• Skill: This feature captures the competence of the
attacker in terms of IT skills.
• Education: The education level of the attacker is
described by this feature.
• Risk: A person trying to avoid risks is very likely to
behave in a different way compared to one that is risk
prone. This feature tries to capture this aspect of the
attacker’s profile.
• Gender: Being able to state whether the person the
attack is a male or a female can significantly help a
forensics investigation.
• Goal: This features describes what was the reason for
the attacker to target the computer system in question.
A person that attacks a system in order to achieve
financial gains needs to be treated separately compared
to one that does it out of curiosity or in order to state
his political beliefs.
• Speed: This feature measures the speed of the cyber
attacker in commands per second. It is directly related
to the attacker’s IT skill level.
Table I
CLASSIFICATION OF FEATURES WITH RESPECT TO OBSERVABILITY
Feature Observable
Skill No
Education No
Risk No
Gender No
Goal No
Speed Yes
Mistakes Yes
Anti-forensics Yes
Success Yes
• Mistakes: A highly skilled attacker would make less
mistakes compared to an inexperienced one. This fea-
ture captures the number of mistaken commands issued
by the attacker in the course of the cyber attack.
• Anti-forensics: One of the most important elements
of a forensic investigation is the analysis of potential
tracks the attacker has left behind. This feature discrim-
inates between attackers that tried to cover their tracks
(e.g. by deleting log files) and the ones that did not
take any such actions.
• Success: This feature describes weather the attacker
was successful in carrying out the cyber-attack.
B. Classification of cyber-attacker features
A natural question arises when we think of the features we
identified within the context of a cyber attack in progress:
how would one monitor the computer system in question in
order to identify these features? Motivated by this observa-
tion, we have categorized the cyber-attacker features in terms
of observability. The term observability describes our ability
to define the value of a feature based on measurements that
have taken place on the machine being attacked. Table I
illustrates this classification of cyber-attacker features.
C. Profiling Data Collection
Performing the actual measurement of an observable fea-
ture is not a straightforward task. There are many methods
that could be adopted, depending on the software tools
available and the architecture of the computer system being
attacked. The approach we adopted was based on a software
tool we developed, running on the computer system being
attacked. The software is responsible for monitoring and
recording the values of the observable features we have
identified.
Figure 1 illustrates the experimental setup for the collec-
tion of profiling data. Our data consist of 87 participants
being asked to conduct a cyber attack against a computer
system. Each participant is given the IP address of the target
machine and is asked to attack it by scanning for potential
vulnerabilities and use the respective exploitation methods
to gain access. When the attacker manages to connect to
compromise the target machine, the profiling tool detects
this event and starts recording the changes in the values of
Figure 1. Experimental setup for profiling data collection
the observable features. These include the speed at which
the attacker is issuing commands, the potential mistakes he
makes, his attempts at covering his tracks by deleting log
files and any actions that qualify as a successful attack.
We should note that the latter depends on the computer
system in question and can vary from accessing a specific
folder to deleting user data. When configuring the profiling
tool, we must define which actions qualify as a successful
attack. Regarding the collection of non observable data, each
participant was asked to fill in a questionnaire.
V. DESCRIPTION OF THE CYBER-PROFILING SYSTEM
For the needs of the data analysis and classification,
machine learning was applied in the form of predictive
modelling. Our target was to be able to identify underlying
rules and data patterns, associate attributes and extract
knowledge regarding the attacker’s profile by identifying a
prediction function for the target fields. As input variables
were regarded the four observable features from the server
side (Speed, Mistakes, Anti-forensics, Success). The latter
were used as predictors for the six attributes of Education,
Risk, Gender, Goal, Age and Skill in an attempt to illustrate
the intruder’s profile.
A. Balancing
Machine learning was imposed, following the CRISP
framework [24] in terms of cleaning, cleansing, auditing and
qualifying the data quality of the 87 user cases. In order
to build a qualitative, scalable model and avoid data over-
fitting, any biased data were excluded from the provided
dataset. This was achieved through balancing. For example,
the dataset contained 84.93% male (“m”) and 15.07% fe-
male cases (“f”). Balancing data with approximately equal
numbers of “f” and “m” seemed to build a more accurate
model and successfully discovered patterns within data. The
algorithms seemed to work successfully with variations of
for example 65% male versus 35% female users and not
strictly between a 50-50% distribution.
B. Modelling
For the modelling part, data transformation was applied;
data were balanced with sampling and transformation meth-
ods were used (e.g. dimension reduction) to minimise ex-
plicitly the chances of over fitting. The selected machine
learning algorithms were justified based on their ability
to identify and generate rules based on variable inter-
associations. Decision tree learning was selected as the
most appropriate predictive approach to classify the attribute
associations and project them via a visual representation.
This assists significantly to both the indented rule generation
as well as providing an unambiguous way of interpreting
the algorithmic results. For the needs of the classification
four algorithms were selected and applied based on their
characteristics. Those were the: C5.0, improved version of
C4.5 [25], CHAID [26], Classification and regression trees
(CART) [27] and QUEST [28]. Based on a preliminary
performance analysis, it seemed that CHAID and QUEST
were not sufficient for the modelling part. That was due
to their inability to process the investigated variables (over-
fitting), their stopping criteria were not met and they failed to
recognise patterns on any provided data. This was probably
due to the size and range of the provided data. However,
C5.0 and CART seemed efficient in terms of generating
decision trees and rule association with certain confidence.
C. Generated Rules and Results
For the needs of these experiments a 10-fold validation
was used and its results were averaged to project predictions.
In order to test and evaluate the proposed model the dataset
was separated in train and test sets with 70-30% distribu-
tion. For balancing nodes the distribution was 75-25% for
training-test sets respectively due to the lack of rare events
and homogeneity of the sets. Both C5.0 and CART were
applied on balanced and unbalanced datasets in a pursuit
to depict any association rules among variables. In order to
standardise the extracted rules each algorithm was applied 10
times on any investigated dataset and its most prevalent rules
were recorded. These rules were validated by applying them
10 times to randomly selected (test) sets. Figure 2 shows
the extracted rules from C5.0 for the target field education
whereas Figure 3 shows the extracted decision tree from
CART for the same attribute.
Both C5.0 and CART were used to extract any associated
rules among predictors and the 6 target variables. Their
efficiency varied, with C5.0 being most successful in terms
of target attributes, reaching approximately an averaged
60% success over all attributes. CART performed slightly
better, approximately 61%, excluding over-fitted age and
goal attributes. Averaging predictions over all attributes, its
results go beyond 50% which seems unsatisfactory for this
experiment.
Figure 4 shows the overall classification performance for
both C5.0 and CART.
As it can be seen C5.0 performs better compared to CART
with performance range between approximately 55% and
80% for Education, Risk, Gender; 68% for Age and 58%
for Skill. CART has equivalent performance for Education,
Figure 4. Comparison between C5.0 and CRT
Figure 5. The interface of the cyber-profiling tool
Risk and Gender, however Goal and Age over-fits. Skill is
predicted with 52% success which may be acceptable, still
though less compared to C5.0.
VI. CYBER-PROFILING TOOL AND BOTNET DETECTION
The software tool we used in Section IV-C for monitoring
and collecting the observable cyber-attacker features can
also be applied for the detection of a botnet attack against
a computer system. Before we explain how this can be
achieved, let us give a detailed description of the tool’s
functionality.
At its current form the tool can distinguish among the four
observable features we described in Section IV-B. Whenever
a new attack event has been detected, the tool classifies it
based on its type and also logs the time at which the event
occurred. Figure 5 illustrates the graphical user interface
of the tool. The left panel shows the attack events that
have been detected, along with their respective timestamps.
The right panel depicts the output of the Machine Learning
algorithm that runs in the background and uses the observed
features as input for predicting the attacker’s profile charac-
teristics.
In order to evaluate our tool with respect to botnet
detection, we developed a bot prototype which replicates the
initial infection phase of a botnet’s life-cycle [23]. During
Figure 2. Extracted rules for Intruder’s education using C5.0
Figure 3. Extracted rules for Intruder’s education using CART
Figure 6. Bot detection using profile metrics
this phase, the bot scans potential victim machines for
known vulnerabilities and uses various exploitation methods
to infect them. Our prototype reproduces this behaviour
by targeting the victim machine. Using our cyber profiling
software, we monitored the values of the observable features
for the case of the bot attack. In Figure 6 we illustrate the
observed values for speed and command mistakes for the
case of human and bot attackers.
We can observe that the bot attack event clearly lies
outside the cluster formed by the human attack events. The
reason for this is twofold: firstly the speed at which a bot
issues commands is far higher than that of a human attacker.
Secondly, since a bot is essentially a computer software
the number of mistaken commands is expected to be zero.
On the contrary, a human attacker will most likely make
mistakes when interacting with a computer system.
We should also note the two sub-clusters forming inside
the cluster of human attacks. We can verify that the success-
ful attacks are characterized by a high command issuing
speed and a low number of command mistakes. This is a
strong indication that our observable features can identify a
more skillful attacker (i.e. fast and cautious) who is more
successful in carrying out an attack.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we presented a system that aims to detect the
characteristics of a human cyber adversary. We have identi-
fied several human profile features and have classified them
based on their observability. We have used our previously
collected experimental data in conjunction with a machine
learning approach that classifies the attacker based on the
values of the observed features. An automated profiling tool
has also been developed. Our initial results indicate that by
using the aforementioned features we are able to extract
the characteristics of a human adversary and also give an
indication of a botnet attack.
In future work we will investigate the extraction of
different cyber-profiling features and how it affects the
performance of our system. Moreover, we will conduct
further experiments with larger participant population and
will also design alternative profiling algorithms to be used
in the cyber-profiling tool.
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